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10/08/2003 Entry: "The problem of evil"

I've been at a fantastic lecture this evening, "The Problem of Evil", given by Professor D Z Phillips. He's a philosopher and a Christian (not a Christian Philosopher) but not, he claims, a theologian and it was refreshing to hear an alternate approach to a question that most (all?) Christians have fielded at some point. I couldn't adequtely summarise a lecture that was itself some of the thought distilled from a soon-to-be-published book, but I have to share some of it! If anyone reads this who was present at the lecture - do "chip in" if you think I've got the wrong end of the stick.

The problem is simply stated. God is omnipotent. God is perfectly good. Evil exists in the world. The "logical" problem of evil is that these three propositions can't all be true. There is no arguing with the third of them, so what remains is that either God is able to prevent evil but does not, in which case he is not perfectly good, or else he is not able in which case he is not omnipotent.

Prof Phillips' approach was to consider how those statements are used. When philosophers say "God is omnipotent" they do not begin with God, but with an abstract definition of omnipotence: the ability to do anything that can be described without contradiction. This is a false starting point because it does not begin with God as he is known (or claimed to be known if you insist). He reminded us that there are many things which God cannot do: ride a bicycle, learn a language, lick an ice cream, bang his head, forget something. The list, once begun, is huge. There are many kinds of power, and not all of them can be ascribed to God: to say that God is omnipotent does not mean that there is one kind of power and God has all of it. So we should begin, not with omnipotence, but with "What do we mean when we speak of the power of God?" The question has a religious context which cannot be ignored.

Similarly, the second statement that "God is perfectly good". Most philosophy begins by accepting that God's will is unbounded - he could ask me, for example, to murder my wife or betray my friends. Philosophy defines freedom in terms of the ability to choose between doing or not doing, and a decision is only "rational" if it is chosen from alternatives. But, says Phillips, in the real world not every act is an act of choosing. Some things are simply done. One example he gave was of "going home": Imagine, he said, that at the end of the day's lectures I'm invited to the bar and I drink too much whisky and get drunk. Then I'll try to get home. Or there is an argument and I announce I'm not going home that night, but when I've calmed down I realise I'm being childish and then I decide to go home. But most nights I don't and i don't decide -- I just go home.

The usual way of "solving" the problem of evil, that God has "morally sufficient" reasons for allowing evil was rejected as "religious utilitarianism". Taking the Holocaust as a "test case" he suggests that it is utterly inadequate to say that there is good which could not have arisen without the evil. Even if that were true, God would still not emerge with nothing to answer for. Suffering, he says "is not instrumental".

Most of the lecture was concerned with pointing out what he saw as the inadequacy of conventional treatments of the problem of evil. He offered a few signposts for developing a more adequate response. He begins with asking "What do we mean when we talk about God?" and notes that from the Greeks onward the notion of God arises from human wonder at our existence. For the religious, existence is a grace, not a "right" and not for possession. When the scriptures say that God is spirit, they mean a spirit of grace and of love. Faith offers a "witness in extremis" - evil does not render grace and love pointless. The "answer" to the problem of evil for Jews and Christians must begin with the "suffering Servant" and the crucified Jesus. This is not merely a story with a happy ending because the resurrection does not erase the wounds. The cross, the cry of despair, the Body "broken for you" is real and has to be taken seriously. The wounds of Christ have eternal significance.

Posted by Richard @ 10/12/2003 07:34 AM CST

Indeed, Camassia, God did take human form, and certainly could have taken time to learn to rid a bicycle and eat ice cream, if they'd had those things 2000 years ago. No doubt Jesus skipped stones, caught bugs and banged his head more than a few times in his childhood.

Perhaps this is just a bad example, and we're just pickin nits. And maybe there's a better way to illustrate Professor Phillips' point.--Um, what was that point again?--Oh, yeah: that there are things that God cannot do. And I don't agree with that point. I think God can do anything. And that's starting with God, and not with the abstract definition of omnipotence.

Posted by Dash @ 10/12/2003 03:18 AM CST

Sorry if this is a dumb question, but why can't God ride a bicycle, lick an ice cream cone etc.? He could take human form, he can presumably do what we can do. I always just figured he has other things he'd rather be doing.

Posted by Camassia @ 10/10/2003 04:03 PM CST

Wow, that is great stuff. It sounds a lot like Jurgen Moltmann especially in his book The Crucified God. I agree that the secular definitions of omnipotence and power are redefined by the crucifixion. God's omnipotence and power are seen in God hanging on the cross.

Posted by Jennifer @ 10/09/2003 06:00 PM CST

I found it extremely affirming, and very helpful. Really good talk.

Posted by Wood @ 10/09/2003 10:00 AM CST